Commission Handling Dozens of Petitions to Opt Out of Expedited Wind Development

Link to Original Article and Audio Stream

 | Maine Public Radio | FEB 22, 2016

Susan Sharon reports on wind development in Maine’s Unorganized Territory.

Townships and plantations in Maine have until June to opt out of being an “expedited permitting area” for wind development. Already there are nearly two dozen petitions that have been received by the Land Use Planning Commission.

Another 18 petitions are in circulation. But the agency is also hearing from large landowners who want to prevent the removal process from going forward without a formal review.

This is the first time since the Wind Energy Act was passed by the Maine Legislature in 2008 that residents of the Unorganized Territory can take steps to remove themselves from expedited wind permitting areas of the state. Last year lawmakers agreed to give them a six-month window to do so. The clock began ticking in January, and planning manager Samantha Horn Olsen of the Land Use Planning Commission says so far, the numbers are about what was expected.

“There are several hundred townships and plantations in the jurisdiction and so the number could be higher, however there places that are being considered for wind energy development where people are more likely to be interested and then others where that might not be so much of an issue,” she says, “and so you may not see people be interested in filing a petition.”

Getting a township or plantation removed from the expedited area does not ensure that a wind project won’t be developed, but it does mean that developers have to get zoning approval before they apply for a permit, something that is not currently required.

To qualify for removal, petitioners need to collect at least ten percent of residents’ signatures, based on the number of people who voted in the last gubernatorial election. In some places that might only be a handful.

Chris O’Neil of the group Friends of Maine’s Mountains has been trying to get the word out that there’s a June 30 deadline for what he calls a “unique opportunity.”

“We estimate that about 70 areas should take action on this,” he says. “Looking at the spreadsheets and the maps really lets you know that almost everywhere wind development wants to go there are people who live fairly close by.”

The process also gives stakeholders, such as landowners who object to removal, the opportunity to request a formal review.

And Patrick Strauch of the Maine Forest Products Council says he’s aware of several large landowners, members of his organization, who are concerned about how a land use designation change would affect their property and its future potential uses. They are now requesting formal review.

“The landowners have looked at the petitions that have been filed and figured out where there are areas they want to contest those petitions and that’s just the path we’re following that we set up through the legislative process,” he says.

Their request for review requires the Commission to confirm the residency of the petitioners, take comments and possibly hold a public hearing. Horn Olsen says it also requires the Commission to see if the petition for removal meets two fundamental criteria.

“The first one is that the removal of the place will not have an unreasonable, adverse effect on the state’s ability to meet the state goals for wind energy development,” she says. “And the second criterion is that it’s consistent with the principal values and the goals of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan.”

The Wind Energy Act was designed to cut through multiple layers of bureaucracy in a specific zone. But O’Neil says it neglected to give people who live in the area a voice. And he says it’s possible disputes over the the process for removing townships from expedited wind development will wind up in court.

Major power company signs on to wind and hydro transmission project through Maine

PORTLAND, Maine — National Grid, one of the region’s largest utilities, has signed on as a partner in a power transmission project that would link Maine wind projects and Canadian hydropower to population centers in New England.

Massachusetts-based Anbaric Transmission and National Grid on Tuesday announced a partnership to pursue electricity transmission projects, including the 1,000-megawatt Maine Green Line transmission project it originally proposed years ago.

The power line project would be buried through parts of eastern and northern Maine, traveling to Greater Boston along the floor of the Gulf of Maine.

The companies called the partnership the Green Line Infrastructure Alliance, which they said would focus on developing transmission projects to bring onshore wind from Maine and hydropower from eastern Canada into Massachusetts.

Ed Krapels, Anbaric’s chief executive, told The Boston Globe on Tuesday that the partnership gives his company the capital and resources to help finish its Maine Green Line project.

“We’re thrilled that National Grid sees working with Anbaric as a way to help them meet the needs of the region’s energy consumers,” said Krapels said in a prepared statement.

The alliance said on its website that it has identified 2,800 megawatts of transmission projects throughout the region that it anticipates could be delivered incrementally through 2028.

The Globe reported the companies plan to submit their proposal for the Maine Green Line project to federal regulators and regional regulators in 2015 and complete the project by 2020.

The companies said they would meet with stakeholders in coming weeks.

Pittsfield-based Cianbro would take on part of the construction of the Maine transmission project, which could be part of a regional effort to procure more natural gas pipeline capacity and hydropower in order to replace retiring power plants and fight rising electricity prices.

Anbaric’s partnership with National Grid comes after the region’s largest utility, Northeast Utilities, in September partnered with pipeline developer Spectra for a $3 billion project that would increase the region’s access to natural gas.

Utilities regulators in Maine are considering whether electricity ratepayers should support one of many proposals to expand gas pipelines and that discussion is expected to restart at the regional level, where a new fee on all electricity customerson the regional grid could be used to support a mix of new transmission projects.

Series of 3rd party reports blast PPP, toll roads, and dishonest investment projections

The following investigative articles by Angie Schmitt and Payton Chung were published between November 19, 2014 and November 25, 2014 on the Steetsblog Network:

The Indiana Toll Road and the Dark Side of Privately Financed Highways

How Macquarie Makes Money By Losing Money on Toll Roads

The Great Traffic Projection Swindle

Toll Roads Increasingly Put Taxpayers at Risk

The Indiana Toll Road and the Dark Side of Privately Financed Highways

Tuesday, November 18, 2014 | by  and  | Streetsblog USA

Link to Original Article.

This is the first post in a three-part series on the Indiana Toll Road and the use of private finance to build and maintain highways. Part two takes a closer look at how Australian firm Macquarie manages its infrastructure assets. Part three examines the incentives for consultants to exaggerate traffic projections, making terrible boondoggles look like financial winners.

 

Who owns the Indiana Toll Road? Well, as of the bankruptcy filing in September, Macquarie Atlas Roads Limited (MQA Australia), which is joined at the hip to Macquarie Atlas Roads International Limited (MQA Bermuda) on the Australian stock exchange, has a 25 percent stake. Macquarie’s investment bank arm brokers the various transactions related to ownership of the road, collecting fees on each one. Welcome to the world of privately financed infrastructure. Graphic: Macquarie prospectus

 

In September, the operator of the Indiana Toll Road filed for bankruptcy, eight years after inking a $3.8 billion, 75-year concession for the road with the administration of Governor Mitch Daniels.

The implications of the bankruptcy for the financial industry were large enough that ratings agency Standard & Poor’s stepped in immediately to calm nerves. In a press release, the company attempted to distinguish the Indiana venture from similar projects, known as public-private partnerships, or P3s: “We do not believe this bankruptcy will slow the growth of current-generation transportation P3 projects, which have different risk characteristics.”

But the similarities between the Indiana Toll Road and other P3s involving private finance can’t be ignored. And as we’ll see, even the differences aren’t all good news for the American public. Once hailed as the model for a new age of U.S. infrastructure, today the Indiana deal looks more like a canary in a coal mine.

At a time when government and Wall Street are raring to team up on privately financed infrastructure, a look at the Indiana Toll Road reveals several of the red flags to beware in all such deals: an opaque agreement based on proprietary information the public cannot access; a profit-making strategy by the private financier that relies on securitization and fees, divorced from the actual infrastructure product or service; and faulty assumptions underpinning the initial investment, which can incur huge public expense down the line. Though made in the name of innovation and efficiency, private finance deals are often more expensive than conventional bonding, threatening to suck money from taxpayers while propping up infrastructure projects that should never get built.

For the parties who put these deals together, however, the marriage of private finance and public roads is incredibly convenient. Investors are increasingly impatient with record-low returns on conventional bonds, and are turning to infrastructure as an asset class that promises stable, inflation-protected returns over the long run.

Meanwhile, governments are eager to fix decaying infrastructure — but without raising taxes or increasing their capacity to borrow. On the occasion of yet another meeting intended to drum up investor interest, Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx recently wrote on the U.S. Department of Transportation’s blog: “With public investments in our nation’s important transportation assets steadily declining, we need to find better ways to partner with private investors to help rebuild America.”

Those investors are lining up to get in the infrastructure game. According to the Congressional Budget Office, about 40 percent of new urban highways in America were built using the private finance model between 1996 and 2006. Since 2008, that figure has jumped to almost 70 percent.

In an attempt to get even more deals done, the current federal transportation bill ramped up funding for the TIFIA program — which offers subsidized federal loans and other credit assistance, often to projects that also receive private backing — by a factor of eight.

Major private investors have stepped up their lobbying efforts to close more of these lucrative deals. Meridiam North America recently hired Ray LaHood, Foxx’s predecessor as Transportation Secretary, and Macquarie Group — which orchestrated the Indiana fiasco — hired away a White House deputy assistant to “continue strengthening our relationships with key elected officials… while also exploring new investment opportunities.”

 

 

From a PricewaterhouseCoopers report advising readers "how to become a player in the P3 (public-private-partnership infrastructure) market."

 

In the midst of all this excitement about an “emerging market” in privately-financed American road-building comes the big failure of the Indiana Toll Road. In the news cycle following the bankruptcy, pundits praisedformer Indiana governor Mitch Daniels for deftly negotiating the deal. Many experts seem to think that the state of Indiana will almost entirely be shielded from the fallout of this bankruptcy, since it already received its payout and retained the right to set the road’s tolls and enforce its maintenance standards. (That is often not the case in these kinds of deals. Note how Standard and Poor’s says that newer infrastructure deals have “different risk characteristics” — that is, more of the risk falls on the public, something we’ll discuss in the third installment in this series.)

At the time of its sale in 2006, the Indiana Toll Road was the largest infrastructure privatization deal in U.S. history. Investors paid $3.8 billion for the right to operate and collect tolls on the 156-mile road for 75 years. The winning bid raised eyebrows. Sure, the road is heavily traveled by cross-country trucks, but the price was twice what state officials had expected the road to fetch, and $1 billion more than any other group had bid.

But if Indiana did manage to put one over on the financier-owners, Australian firm Macquarie and Spanish firm Ferrovial, as some suggest, those owners don’t seem to be too worried. For Macquarie, an investment bank and financial services firm with almost $400 billion under management, the loss hardly even registered as a blip in its share price:

 

Image via Google

 

Under the terms of the bankruptcy deal approved last month, ITR Concession Co. LLC – the company Macquarie and Ferrovial formed – will either be sold at auction, with proceeds distributed among its creditors, or those creditors will themselves buy a 95.75 percent stake in the restructured company, thanks to a fresh $2.75 billion round of borrowing. ITR began its life as a P3 with $3 billion in bank debt, and ITR’s second incarnation could get up and running with $2.75 billion in debt — not exactly a fresh start.

Bloomberg, The Hill, Reuters and the other outlets covering this story all pinned the downfall of ITR on both a risky financing scheme and on faulty traffic projections. Most sources shrugged off the faulty traffic projections as an artifact of the recession, not as part of a longer-term, more permanent shift in driving behavior that has been widely documented.

Whatever the cause, the Indiana Toll Road’s traffic projections were indeed very, very wrong. Although the actual projections contained in the signed contract are proprietary and shielded from public view, the state of Indiana released an analysis they conducted prior to the sale [PDF] showing expected increases amounting to 22 percent every seven years. What actually occurred after ITR took over the lease in 2006 was closer to the inverse: traffic declined more than 11 percent.

But even if traffic levels had met the projections, that would not have been enough to save ITR. As Toll Roads News pointed out, predicted traffic growth plus profit-maximizing toll rates still couldn’t have balanced the books:

They’d still only have toll revenues of $245m. And with interest payments to be made to borrowers of $268m they’d still be losing money.

So in addition to faulty traffic projections, ITR relied on a risky financing scheme that inflated its costs.

Media outlets also noted that the ITR bankruptcy was just the latest and largest in a crop of privately owned tollway failures that now litter the land. In recent years, other privately financed toll roads that have filed for bankruptcy protection have included San Diego’s South Bay Expressway (also owned by Macquarie and the first project to receive federal TIFIA funds), South Carolina’s Southern Connector, and the Alabama and Detroit roads owned by American Roads. Many more are limping along and may well end up bankrupt, like SH-130 outside Austin or the Northwest Parkway between Denver and Boulder.

Bankruptcy or default won’t necessarily eliminate the risk of a public bailout. The 12-year-old Pocahontas Parkway outside Richmond has now failed twice, largely because projected sprawl in its vicinity just never materialized. (Instead, Richmond’s core is booming, as in other metro areas.) Since TIFIA loans account for one-fourth of Pocahontas’ debt, taxpayers will eventually take a hit if the road continues to miss its payments.

Who is Macquarie, and why did it pay so much to run this Indiana highway? What can we learn about private finance in the infrastructure industry by taking a closer look at how Macquarie handled the Indiana Toll Road?

And then, why were traffic projections so far off base in this case? There’s a lot of evidence that engineering firms like Wilbur Smith (now CDM Smith), which produced the faulty forecasts for the ITR, have incentives to inflate traffic projections.

We’ll dig into these questions in the next posts in this series:

Angie Schmitt is a newspaper reporter-turned planner/advocate who manages the Streetsblog Network from glamorous Cleveland, Ohio. She also writes about urban issues particular to the industrial Midwest at Rustwire.com.

Abigail Field: Privatization Is Driven By Private Greed and Public Cowardice (and Public Greed, Too)

Link to Original Article

Posted on May 12, 2014 by Lambert Strether

Lambert here: Apparently, IBGYBG (“I’ll Be Gone, You’ll Be Gone”) applies in government as well as Finance. How cozy.

By Abigail Caplovitz Field, an attorney and a freelance writer. She writes news for Benzinga.com and others, and posts a new blog every Sunday morning at Reality Check.

“Privatization” and “public-private-partnerships” for infrastructure and other public assets are scams driven by private greed and public cowardice. Americans have been burned by these scams. Last month the Atlantic ran a nice piece on the growing privatization backlash.

Unfortunately, as governments at the city, state and federal level continue to lack the political will to raise taxes or cut spending, as our infrastructure continues to deteriorate, and as political leaders such as President Obama and Congress peddle the idea, the pressure to privatize public goods will continue to rise. Indeed, it’s no longer companies like Deloitte offering to do deals; we’ve reached the point where the Motley Fool is pitching retail investors.

The New Jersey Toll Road Privatization Push

It’s a topic I’ve given a lot of thought to, because in my role as Legislative Advocate for NJPIRG, I played a meaningful role in defeating then-New Jersey Governor, nee Goldman Sachs Jon Corzine’s push to privatize New Jersey’s ‘three big roads’–the Turnpike, the Garden State Parkway, and the Atlantic City Expressway.

The policy arguments we made then (2007)–and which USPIRG and others continue to make today–remain true, and provide a good, accessible framework for judging any privatization deal that may affect you.

As you read the NJ story and our cheat sheet for judging proposed deals, consider what’s at stake– the level of traffic congestion and air pollution, the safety and quality of roads, and even the availability of high-quality affordable mass transit alternatives.

When Governor Corzine came into office, there was a political consensus among a sufficiently large and diverse coalition of interests that the best way to fund New Jersey’s transportation needs was to raise its very low gas tax. But rather than gather and lead this political will to pass the tax hike–something that would have taken courage, but not heroism–Governor Corzine pushed the privatization idea. I don’t know if ducked the tax hike because he was a coward, or greedy, or driven by his deep saturation in Wall Street’s greed ethos.

Regardless, Corzine (and his Democratic legislative allies, most notably State Senator Raymond Lesniak) suggested that New Jersey should fix its chronic budget crisis by leasing the New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State Parkway and Atlantic City Expressway to a private operator for 75 years. The private operator would be guaranteed annual toll hikes, given management of the ‘three big roads‘ and would pay the state some $20 billion.

Six Principles For Judging PPP Deals

I published an Op-Ed in the Trenton Times on May 18, 2007 that explained how to judge a deal that we (I worked closely with USPIRG’s Phineas Baxandall) later fully developed in this white paper:

1. Public Control: public policy, not protecting private profit, had to control key management decisions that would not only affect the leased roads, but also the communities all along the roads. Because of the roads at stake in New Jersey, the issue was really statewide transportation policy.

What were we talking about? As the white paper explains:

“…toll levels, maintenance and safety standards, and congestion on the Turnpike and Parkway have a substantial impact on the number of cars using alternative routes, including local roads and mass transit. …

In the wake of the last Turnpike toll hike, for instance, many communities felt the impact of trucks diverted onto local roads…. Public control of key toll roads is necessary to ensure a coherent statewide transportation planning and policy making.

… Three examples illustrate these potential dangers:

● Non-Compete Clauses—Deals in California, Colorado, and to a lesser extent, Indiana, limited the state’s ability to improve or expand “competing” roads. In New Jersey…virtually all major roads compete for cars with the Turnpike and the Parkway.

● Private Toll Decisions = Broad Private Control of Traffic Management—If the rules for increasing toll rates under Chicago toll road deal had applied to the Holland Tunnel since its inception, that roadway could presently charge a one-way toll of more than $180. As a practical matter, an operator would be unlikely to charge that price because drivers would instead take alternate routes. The point is that the Chicago toll-increase schedule effectively allows the private operator to charge whatever maximizes its profits. The toll operator can also offer discounts to particular types of motorists or encourage traffic between certain exits, as will maximize profits. Together these powers enable the operator to control toll policy, and thus dictate who drives on the toll roads, and when…

[Note: although Senator Lesniak said he would require annual toll hikes but limited them to the rate of inflation, even that doesn’t solve the issue; New Jersey would have given up its ability to set toll rates, and thus all its consequences, for 75 years. It’s not just about how high tolls go; it’s about controlling the policy–congestion pricing, HOV discounts, Lexus Lanes, etc.]

● Creates “Tax” on Normal Policy Making—The Indiana deal also requires the state to pay investors compensation for reduced toll revenue when the state performs construction such as when it might add an exit, build a mass transit line down the median, or bring the road up to state-of-the-art safety standards. This compensation would add significant costs, and potentially the state could not afford to do the work it would otherwise perform. As added complication, the exact level of these future payments might be subject to dispute and lawsuits.

2. Fair Value: deals pay the state far less money than its assets were worth, as the Atlantic article notes. In New Jersey, the best public advocate on this point was Peter Humphreys, then head of securization practice at the then 13th largest American law firm (McDermott, Will & Emery).

He testified before the Assembly Transportation Committee and explained the state could itself securitize the existing annual toll revenue of $700 million for a 15-year period and get an upfront payment of about $8.4 billion. Senator Lesniak’s approach imagined getting $20 billion from a 75 year deal. Thus serial securitizations–without changing the existing toll rates–for the same 75-year time frame would produce a nominal $42 billion.

Sure, that serial securization doesn’t account for the time value of money; but it also doesn’t consider the future toll hikes guaranteed to the private lessee. If the hikes contemplated in the Lesniak deal were enacted and also securitized, the serial figure would be much higher. $20 billion was way too little.

And it’s not just New Jersey; as the white paper recaps:

A financial analysis of the Indiana and Chicago deals by NW Financial, a New Jersey investment bank that represents the Turnpike Authority (among others), found that the private investors in those deals would likely recoup their investment in less than 20 years. That analysis is confirmed in at least Indiana’s case by the company that won the bid. Macquarie sent investors a presentation asserting an “Anticipated 15 year payback to equity.” Given that Indiana’s deal is 75 years long, and Chicago’s is 99 years, the analysis suggests that governments in these states received far less for their assets than they are worth.

3. Deals capped at 30 years. As I noted in the Trenton Times Op-Ed:

Sen. Raymond Lesniak (D-Union) has introduced a bill authorizing a 75-
year deal here, in the ballpark of Chicago’s 99 years and Indiana’s 75.
Some perspective: Henry Ford introduced the Model T 99 years ago, and the George Washington Bridge opened 76 years ago. The first section of the New Jersey Turnpike didn’t open until a mere 56 years ago.

Population also shifts dramatically on these timelines. In 1930, New
Jersey’s population was 4 million; 70 years later, it more than doubled
to 8.4 million.

From these markers, it’s clear that massive, unforeseeable changes will likely take place for transportation technology, networks and
demographics over the 75-year time frame being considered here. In the face of such uncertainty, New Jersey cannot predict its future
transportation needs, nor the revenue potential of its toll roads, well
enough to negotiate a deal that fairly allocates risks, dictates policy
or sets a fair price.

To minimize this problem, New Jersey must not enter a deal longer than 30 years.

4. State-of-the-art maintenance and safety standards. As we put it in the white paper:

The New Jersey Turnpike has been innovative throughout its history. Many of its design and safety choices have been replicated throughout the country and world. It is also recognized as having traffic management and danger warning systems that are among the best in the world. Similarly, the Garden State Parkway is consistently one of America’s safest roads.

…Indiana’s deal, for example, would not guarantee this performance. … the state of Indiana can require the operator to meet generally applicable safety standards, but must pay a hefty premium to implement higher quality…. In addition to the cost of construction or performing the maintenance, Indiana would be required to pay compensation to the private operator for any loss of revenues caused by the construction or imposition of new standards.

No deal for the Turnpike and Parkway should be approved that did not guarantee that state-of-the-art innovations would continue to be introduced.

5. Complete Transparency and Accountability. Again from the white paper:

…That requires full disclosure of the deal’s terms, and any related contracts and subcontracts, at least six months before a deal is done, plus public hearings. This commitment to transparency is doubly important given New Jersey’s past struggles with corruption and pay-to-play contracts. The public must have full confidence in the process for considering a potential deal.

Likewise, New Jerseyans need to be able to hold their representatives accountable for their decision to approve (or not approve) a deal. The Legislature must vote on the final terms of any potential deal. True accountability requires that both the Legislative and Executive Branches answer to New Jerseyans

6. No Budget Gimmicks. This one is self-explanatory, but also crucial, as Legislatures typically blow the wad of cash they get from these deals without fixing anything. The Atlantic piece mentions some of that, as does the white paper.

In response to our campaign based on the principles–we demanded the Governor sign a pledge to honor them–he came out with some nice sounding principles that didn’t go nearly far enough, as I discussed in this Op-Ed in the Newark Star Ledger July 10, 2007.

Ultimately the plan cratered. The Assembly Transportation Committee, led by Assemblyman John Wisniewski (also a Democrat) was a major reason why.

While NJPIRGs position always was: privatization is fine if done right–and the principles defined “right”–realize that Wall Street will never do a deal that lives up to the six principles. It’s just not profitable enough for them, and would put too much risk on them.

Extracting “Latent Income” (NOT!)

I began by claiming cowardice and greed are the reason these deals are done. Of course, that’s not the official line. The NJ framing of the advantage of privatization–which was branded as “monetizing” the turnpike, parkway and expressway–was reported in this April 12, 2007 Philadelphia Inquirer article this way:

““Monetizing” assets means squeezing latent income from them by selling or leasing them.”

As I pointed out in this letter to the editor about that article:

The article stated that “‘monetizing’ assets means squeezing latent income from them by selling or leasing them.” The Inquirer’s readers may imagine that this process harnesses additional value or productivity from the roads themselves. That is not the case.

“Monetization” simply means to borrow against a future source of revenue. Instead of receiving toll money at a later date, the government would receive cash up front today. Thus, monetization only “extracts latent income” the way individuals do when they take out a payday loan or a second mortgage.

To be fair, I should have said “in this case Monetization simply means” as monetizing doesn’t have to involve borrowing. But that doesn’t change my point then or now. The myth of privatization is that private companies can magically make things more valuable than government can, without articulating a coherent, stands up to scrutiny reason why it can.

Given that $20 billion was much less than the 75 year toll revenue was worth, where was the latent value extraction in the Lesniak deal?

Cowardice And Greed

Public policy involves tough choices. Privatization deals offer legislatures and governors an easy sounding way out; let stuff happen long after they’re out of office (and hope that’s when the bad consequences hit), and get in return a big wad of cash to blow now. No need to raise taxes or cut services.

Thus often privatization advocates on the government side are simply cowards–they don’t want to raise taxes, and they don’t want to cut spending.

The greed happens on both sides. On the private side, it’s the extraordinary profit potential. On the public side, greed can also shape decisions whether through quid pro quo type corruption or revolving door corruption.

And of course, greed and cowardice are not mutually exclusive motives.

While America Spars Over Keystone XL, A Vast Network of Pipelines is Quietly Being Approved

BY KATIE VALENTINE ON MARCH 20, 2014   ClimateProgress

After countless marches, arrests, Congressional votes, and editorials, the five-and-a-half year battle over the controversial Keystone XL pipeline is nearing its end. If a recent ruling in Nebraska doesn’t delay the decision further, America could find out as soon as this spring whether or not the pipeline, which has become a focal point in America’s environmental movement, will be built.

But while critics and proponents of Keystone XL have sparred over the last few years, numerous pipelines — many of them slated to carry the same Canadian tar sands crude as Keystone — have been proposed, permitted, and even seen construction begin in the U.S. and Canada. Some rival Keystone XL in size and capacity; others, when linked up with existing and planned pipelines, would carry more oil than the 1,179-mile pipeline.

Read More: http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/03/20/3254081/pipelines-you-havent-heard-of/#

 

Pipeline rupture report raises questions about TransCanada inspections

Feb 04, 2014 10:29 PM ET
Amber Hildebrandt, CBC News

A CBC News investigation has unearthed a critical report that the federal regulator effectively buried for several years about a rupture on a trouble-prone TransCanada natural gas pipeline.

On July 20, 2009, the Peace River Mainline in northern Alberta exploded, sending 50-metre-tall flames into the air and razing a two-hectare wooded area.

Members of Dene Tha’ First Nations community of Chateh, about 50 kilometres away from the site of the blast, also want to know why the report was not released until now.(Courtesy of Dene Tha’ First Nation)

 

 

Few people ever learned of the rupture — one of the largest in the past decade — other than the Dene Tha’ First Nation, whose traditional territory it happened on.